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This paper proposes a model in which the decision maker builds an optimally simplified representation
of the world which is "sparse," i.e., uses few parameters that are non-zero. Sparsity is formulated so
as to lead to well-behaved, convex maximization problems. The agent's choice of a representation
of the world features a quadratic proxy for the benefits of thinking and a linear formulation for the
costs of thinking. The agent then picks the optimal action given his representation of the world. This
model yields a tractable procedure, which embeds the traditional rational agent as a particular case,
and can be used for analyzing classic economic questions under bounded rationality. For instance,
the paper studies how boundedly rational agents select a consumption bundle while paying imperfect
attention to prices, and how frictionless firms set prices optimally in response. This leads to a novel
mechanism for price rigidity. The model is also used to examine boundedly rational intertemporal
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This paper proposes a tractable model of some dimensions of bounded rationality (BR). It
is designed to be easy to apply in concrete economic situations, and to inject a modicum
of bounded rationality into existing models. It allows to study how and when bounded
rationality makes an important di⁄erence for economic outcomes.
Its principles are the following. First, the decision maker in the model is not the tra-
ditional rational agent, but is best thought of as an economist building a simpli￿ed model
of the world (a model-in-model). He builds a representation of the world that is simple
enough, and thinks about the world through his partial model. Second, and most crucially,
this representation is ￿sparse,￿ i.e., uses few parameters that are non-zero or di⁄er from
the usual state of a⁄airs.1 I draw from the fairly recent literature on statistics and image
processing to use a notion of ￿sparsity￿that still leads to well-behaved, convex maximization
problems. Third, the maximization can itself be imperfect, with a penalty that rises as the
action taken becomes increasingly di⁄erent from the default action, and it relies on the same
sparsity criterion.
The decision maker simpli￿es his model of the world. For instance, he builds a model
where some parameters are irrelevant (while they actually do matter to some degree), where
some future cash ￿ ows do not occur, and where some variables are deterministic rather
than random. He assumes convenient probability distributions rather than the complexity
of reality: e.g., he might assume a distribution with two outcomes rather than a continuum
of outcomes. These choices are controlled by an optimization of his representation of the
world.
To motivate the model, I ￿rst consider a simple situation in which the decision maker
wishes to make a decision that should be the weighted sum of many factors, such as his
own income but also GDP growth in his country, the interest rate, recent progress in the
construction of plastics, interest rates in Hungary, the state of the Amazonian forest, etc.
Since it would be too burdensome to take all of these variables into account, he is going to
discard most of them.2 I study how to specify the cost of enriching the decision maker￿ s
1The meaning of ￿sparse￿is that of a sparse vector or matrix. For instance, a vector in ￿ 2 R100;000 with
only a few non-zero elements is sparse.
2Ignoring variables altogether and assuming that they do not di⁄er from their usual values are the same
thing in the model. For instance, in most decisions we do not pay attention to the quantity of oxygen that is
available to us because there is plenty of it. In the model, ignoring the oxygen factor is modeled as assuming
that the quantity of oxygen available is the normal quantity. Indeed, the two are arguably the same thing.
2representation of the world. Following antecedents in statistics and applied mathematics
(Tibshirani 1996, CandŁs and Tao 2006, Donoho 2006), I show that one is particularly
appealing: the ‘1 norm, i.e., the sum of absolute values of the non-zero updates in the
variables. The reasons are as follows. First, a quadratic cost would not generate sparsity:
small updates would have a miniscule penalty, hence under that model the decision maker
would have non-sparse representations. Second, a ￿xed cost per variable would give sparsity
but lose tractability; ￿xed costs lead to non-convex problems that make the solution very
complicated in general. Instead, the ‘1 penalty both gives sparsity and maintains tractability.
The model generates full or partial inattention to many variables.
The unweighted ‘1 criterion, used in the basic quadratic target problem, may not work in
general: for instance, dimensions might not be comparable ￿e.g., the units could be di⁄erent.
I study how to generalize it. It turns out that, under some reasonable conditions, there is
only one unique algorithm that (i) penalizes the sum of absolute values in the symmetric
quadratic target problem, and (ii) is invariant to changes in units and various rotations of
the problem. This is the algorithm I state as the ￿Sparse BR￿ algorithm. Hence, basic
invariance considerations lead to an algorithm that is fairly tightly constrained. In addition,
the algorithm involves just a simple optimization problem, so it is easy to apply.
I apply the model to a few of the main building blocks of economics, so that a modicum
of bounded rationality can be injected into them and we can see when and how bounded
rationality makes a di⁄erence for economic outcomes.
I ￿rst study intertemporal consumption. In this model, the agent may not think about
all sources of income variables. Namely, he anticipates more about the usually important
one, and less or nothing at all about the small ones. As a result, the marginal propensity to
consume is di⁄erent across income streams, whereas it would be the same in the traditional
model. This is much like Thaler￿ s (1985) ￿mental accounts.￿Also, this generates system-
atic deviations from Euler equations: they point towards inertia as agents will react in a
dampened way to many future variables.
The next basic machinery of economics I apply BR to is a decision maker buying a vector
of n goods. He is the traditional agent, except that he wishes to economize on thinking about
all prices. The model generates a zone of insensitivity to prices: when prices are close to
the average price, the decision maker does not pay attention to them. I then study how a
￿rm will optimally price goods sold to such BR consumers. It is clear that the ￿rm will not
just choose any price strictly inside the zone of consumer inattention: it will rather select a
price at its upper bound. Hence, a whole zone of prices will not be picked by ￿rms. Even
as the marginal cost of goods changes, there will be a zone of complete price rigidity. In
addition, there is an asymmetry: there will sometimes be discrete downward jumps of the
3price (￿sales￿ ) but no corresponding upward jumps from the normal price (the asymmetry
is due to the fact that the ￿rm wants to keep a price as high as possible). Hence, we yield
a tractable mechanism for price rigidity based on consumer bounded rationality rather than
￿rms￿menu costs.
Then, I also consider a few more psychological phenomena. One is that of cognitive
overload: when the agent is confronted with too many decisions to make, the ￿cognitive
budget constraint￿becomes saturated and the quality of his decision making decreases. I
also consider the endowment e⁄ect. In the model, the agent wishes to stay close to the
default or status quo, which naturally generates an endowment e⁄ect. The value added by
the model is that it yields a prediction of the size of the e⁄ect. As the Sparse-BR agent
wishes to remain with the status quo when there is more model uncertainty, we obtain a
higher endowment e⁄ect when the value of the good is more uncertain. This is di⁄erent from
prospect theory where the size of the e⁄ect depends only on the hedonic value of the good.
Hence, the model explains why more experienced traders (List 2003) exhibit a much weaker
endowment e⁄ect.
This paper tries to strike a balance between psychological realism and model tractability.
The goal for the model is to be applicable without extensive complexity, and at the same time
to capture some dimensions of bounded rationality. The central elements of this paper ￿the
use of the ‘1 norm to model bounded rationality (rather than physical transaction costs), the
accent on sparsity, and the Sparse BR algorithm ￿are, to the best of my knowledge, novel.
I defer the discussion of the relationship between this paper and the rest of the literature to
later in the paper when the reader is familiar with the key elements of the model.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 motivates the model in the context of a
stylized model where the goal is to hit a target. Section 3 states the basic model. Section
4 applies the latter to a few basic economic problems. One is how a BR consumer selects
a bundle of n goods while not completely processing the vector of prices. I also work out
how a monopolist optimally sets prices given such a consumer: we will yield a novel source
of real price rigidity, alongside occasional ￿sales￿with large temporary changes in prices.
Section 5 applies the idea of di⁄erent representations to the simpli￿cation of random vari-
ables and categorization, using the language of ￿dictionaries￿from the applied mathematics
literature. Section 6 presents various enrichments of the model, for instance to discrete ac-
tions and models with constraints. It also discusses links with existing themes in behavioral
economics. Section 7 discusses the limitations of this approach, and concludes. Many proofs
are delegated to the appendix or the online appendix.
42 A Motivation: Sparsity and ‘1 Norm
We are developing a model where agents have sparse representations of the world, i.e., many
parameters are set to ￿0,￿the default values. To ￿x ideas, consider the following decision
problem.
Problem 1 (Choice Problem with Quadratic Loss) The random variables xi and weights ￿i
are freely available to the decision maker, though perhaps hard to process. The problem is:










For instance, to choose consumption a (normalized from some baseline), the decision maker
should consider not only his wealth, x1, and the deviation of GDP from its trend, x2, but
also the interest rate, x10, demographic trends in China, x100, recent discoveries in the supply
of copper, x200, etc. There are n > 10;000 (say) factors x1;:::;xn that should in principle be
taken into account. However, most of them have a small impact on his decision, i.e., their
impact ￿i is small in absolute value.
Hence, we want to model an agent that does not wish to bear the costs of analyzing all





for some vector m that endogenously has lots of zeros, i.e., m is ￿sparse.￿For instance, if
the agent only pays attention to his wage and the state of the economy, m1 and m2 will be
non-zero, and the other mi￿ s will be zero.
Consider the expected loss from taking the imperfect (but parsimonious) policy a(m)
rather than the fully inclusive (but very expensive) policy a(￿): L = E[V (a(￿);x;￿) ￿ V (a(m);x;￿)].







￿ixi)2], and assuming for simplicity that the xi￿ s are








We desire a systematic procedure to predict how an agent will pick the ￿important














with ￿ > 0 and ￿ ￿ 0. The ￿rst term is the utility loss from an imperfect representation of
the world, mi. The second term, ￿
P
i jmij
￿, represents a penalty for lack of sparsity: when
the decision maker has a non-zero or large jmij, he pays a cost ￿jmij
￿ where ￿ is a cost
parameter.
Let us analyze what ￿ would be appealing given that we want to capture that the decision
maker has a sparse vector m. One natural choice would be ￿ = 2, which leads to a quadratic
cost function. Then, we obtain ￿(mi ￿ ￿i) ￿ 2￿mi = 0, i.e., mi = ￿i=(1 + 2￿). This does
not yield any sparsity: all features matter, regardless of whether ￿i is small or large. We
just get some uniform dampening. Hence, we seek something else.
Another natural modeling choice would be ￿ = 0 (with the convention jmj
￿ = 1m6=0),
which leads to a ￿xed cost function: the decision maker pays a cost ￿ for each non-zero
element. Then, the solution is: mi = ￿i if j￿ij ￿
p
2￿, and mi = 0 otherwise. Now we
do obtain sparsity. However, there is a large cost in terms of tractability. Problem 1 is
no longer convex when ￿ = 0 (it is convex if and only if ￿ ￿ 1). Its general formulation
(minm2Rn F (m) + ￿
P
i 1mi 6= 0, for a convex F) is very hard to solve, and indeed generally
untractable in a precise sense.3
Now consider the problem with ￿ = 1, i.e., a linear cost (with absolute values), as argued
in the recent statistics and applied mathematics literature (Tibshirani 1996, CandŁs and Tao
2006, Donoho 2006). Then, problem (1) is convex. Let us solve it. Di⁄erentiating (1), we
have:
￿(mi ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿ ￿ sign(m) = 0 (2)
where sign(m) is the sign of m (sign(0) is the shorthand for some number between ￿1 and
1). Let us solve (2) when ￿i > 0. When the solution is mi > 0, we obtain mi = ￿i ￿ ￿,
which requires ￿i > ￿. When 0 ￿ ￿i ￿ ￿, mi = 0. In general, we have:
mi = ￿ (￿i;￿) (3)
for the function ￿ which is plotted in Figure 1 and de￿ned as follows.
De￿nition 1 The ￿anchoring and adjustment￿function ￿ is
￿ (￿;￿) = (j￿j ￿ j￿j)+ sign(￿); (4)
3It is ￿NP-complete￿(Mallat 2009, chapter 12) in the terminology of complexity theory (if vector ￿ has
1,000 components, the brute-force solution would be to study the 21000 ’ 10300 subsets of ￿xed costs).
6Figure 1: The anchoring and adjustment function ￿





￿ + ￿ if ￿ ￿ ￿￿
0 if j￿j < ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ if ￿ ￿ ￿
: (5)
The salient features of (3) are, ￿rst, that when j￿ij < ￿, mi = 0: all the small components
are replaced by 0. This confers sparsity on the model. Second, for ￿i > ￿, mi = ￿i ￿ ￿.
This corresponds to a partial adjustment towards the correct value ￿i. This motivates the
term ￿anchoring and adjustment,￿a phenomenon demonstrated by Tversky and Kahneman
(1974). In their experimental evidence there is anchoring on a default value and partial
adjustment towards the truth (e.g., people pay only partial attention to the base rate when
forming probability inferences).
Formulation (3) yields sparsity: all terms that have j￿ij < ￿ are replaced by mi = 0. For
￿i > ￿, we get mi = ￿i ￿ ￿, so there is a certain degree of dampening.4
The conclusion is that we can use the ‘1 norm, i.e., the one that corresponds to ￿ = 1 in
(1), to generate sparsity and tractability at the same time. It is easy to check that sparsity
is obtained if and only if ￿ 2 [0;1], and tractability (a convex maximization problem) is
obtained if and only if ￿ 2 [1;1). Hence, ￿ = 1 (the ‘1 norm) is the only parametrization
that yields both sparsity and tractability.
We record the following lemma. Note that, in the notation md, d indicates a default
value, not a power.






non-zero components (because mi 6= 0
implies j￿i=￿j ￿ 1). Hence, even with in￿nite-dimensional ￿ and m, provided the norm of ￿ is bounded, m
has a ￿nite number of non-zero components, and is therefore sparse.


















where ￿ is the anchoring and adjustment function given in (4).
Proof. By shifting m ! m￿md, ￿ ! ￿￿md, it is enough to consider the case md = 0.
The f.o.c. is
A(m ￿ ￿) + Ksign(m) = 0:
That is, m = ￿ (￿;K=A).
Let me discuss the interpretation of the model. In this model, the decision maker is
aware of dimension i, and even xi: still, if its importance j￿ij is less than ￿, he discards that
dimension. In that sense, he behaves like an economic modeler (or a physics modeler for
that matter): an economic modeler is aware that there are many things outside his model,
and he often knows how to model them; still, he wishes to discard those dimensions to keep
the model simple. The decision maker does the same here.
Hence, the interpretation suggests some change of focus compared to the more conven-
tional economic approach, which is that of ￿optimization under informational constraints￿
(see Veldkamp 2011 for an excellent survey of this literature). In the present model, the
decision maker knows a lot, but prefers to discard a lot of minor information to keep his
model sparse. The di⁄erences with existing approaches will be discussed in greater depth
later.5
The ￿ function generates underreaction. It is worth seeing that this is a robust feature
of models of noisy cognition. Take the canonical model where the agent receives a signal
s = ￿+", with a non-degenerate noise " uncorrelated with ￿ whose variance diminishes with
cognitive e⁄ort. Then, to minimize a quadratic loss function (m ￿ ￿)
2, it is well known that
for (￿;") Gaussian with mean 0, the optimal signal extraction is m(s) := E[￿ j s] = ￿s with
￿ = var(￿)=var(s) < 1. This implies that E[m(s) j ￿] = ￿￿, which generates dampening
as ￿ < 1. This can increase our con￿dence that it is sensible for our model to generate
dampening.
5In the Sims (2003) entropy framework with Gaussian xi￿ s, one may check that the DM￿ s action (and
signal) is a = c
P
i qixi + ￿ for a positive constant c and an independent Gaussian noise ￿; c and ￿ are
parametrized by the DM￿ s information capacity. Hence, the DM pays attention to all xi￿ s. The decision is
noisy but not sparse.
8A tempting other formulation, ultimately not adopted here, is the following: use (1)
to ￿nd which dimensions to eliminate, but for those that survive, use mi = ￿i, i.e., pay
full attention (like in the ￿xed cost model). In other terms, use the ￿hard thresholding￿
function ￿H (￿;￿) = ￿ ￿ 1j￿j￿j￿j, rather than the ￿soft thresholding￿ function ￿. Indeed,
this ￿H function has been used in statistics (Belloni and Chernozhukov 2010). For some
applications, this may be a useful model. However, it has several disadvantages. First,
underreaction may actually be desirable, as argued above. Second, as it also seems to hold
empirically, response functions are likely to be continuous, at least in the aggregate ￿and a
goal of this paper is to ￿nd a tractable representation of a boundedly rational representative
agent. Indeed, the soft thresholding function ￿ (￿;￿) with ‘1 penalty and parameter ￿ can
be seen as the representative agent aggregation of many heterogenous agents using the ‘0
penalty with di⁄erent ￿xed costs k.6 Third, and more technically, the fact that the hard
thresholding function yields discontinuous response functions makes the model harder to
handle. In contrast, the ‘1 formulation yields a convex decision problem, hence actions
depend continuously on the environment.
Accordingly, I proceed with the ‘1 model and the soft thresholding, anchoring and ad-
justment function ￿. I next generalize this idea to more general problems than the quadratic
model.
3 The Basic Model
3.1 Model Statement
The decision maker has a value function V (a;x;m), and wishes to select an action maxi-
mizing:
max
a V (a;x;￿): (6)
The action a 2 Rna is potentially multi-dimensional, i.e., maximization implies several ac-
tions: it could be the consumption of a good, the chosen allocation for a stock, etc.
The notation m 2 Rnm indicates the ￿representation of the world￿(or ￿model-in-model￿ )
chosen by the agent, while the true (but potentially very complex) model is represented by
a vector ￿. In the previous examples, mi is the importance on a dimension of the world:
when mi = 0, the agent does not think about dimension i, while when mi = ￿i, the agent
fully pays attention to it. The value function is V (a;x;m), and ideally the agent would like
to maximize V (a;x;￿), i.e., the value function evaluated at the true model ￿. However, his
6Indeed, if the distribution of k￿ s is f (k;￿) = 1k>￿￿=k2, aggregation is exact: ￿ (￿;￿) = R 1
0 ￿H (￿;k)f (k;￿)dk.
9concern for sparsity will make him choose a simpler (actually sparser) model m rather than
the true model of the world ￿. Vector x 2 Rnx is a series of quantitative features the decision
maker might pay attention to (in a way modulated by m). When there is no such x (see
Example 2 below), the value function is simply V (a;m).
Finally, the decision maker has a representation md 2 Rnm and a default action ad 2 Rna.
A default representation could be md
i = 0, i.e., ￿do not think about dimension i.￿Typically, a




That will often imply ad = 0, ￿do nothing,￿or more precisely ￿do not deviate from the usual
action.￿Arguably, such ￿do nothing￿heuristics are among the most common decisions we
make. It is directly at the core of the model as a default action.
It is useful to keep some examples in mind. The ￿rst one is the one we started with.
Example 1 (Quadratic Target) We have V (a;x;m) = ￿1
2(a￿
P
i mixi)2, with true weights
￿ and sparser weights m.
The next example shows how the model can capture ￿narrow framing.￿
Example 2 (Narrow Framing): Let a be the optimal stock holding. Call w the baseline
income wealth, e r the excess stock return, and e " the labor income shock of the agent, so that
time-1 consumption is c(m) = w + ae r + me ", with the true weight ￿ = 1, and
V (a;m) = Eu(w + ae r + me "):
In this example, ￿ = 1 means that when picking equities, the decision maker explicitly takes
into account the other gambles in his life, such as labor income shocks. However, when
m = 0, the decision maker uses ￿narrow framing￿or ￿narrow bracketing￿(e.g., Rabin and
Weizs￿cker 2009). The agent thinks about his optimal allocation in equities while forgetting
about the other gambles in his life, such as future income shocks. Hence, the model can o⁄er
predictions about when the agent deviates from a narrow bracket.
The third example demonstrates how the decision maker may not pay full attention to a
variable of interest, such as the interest rate.
Example 3 (Neglected Interest Rate) The decision maker starts with wealth w, consumes a
at time 1, invests at a gross interest rate R, and consumes at time 2. His utility function is:






When m = ￿ ￿ 1, the decision maker consciously uses the true interest rate Rt. However,
when m = md ￿ 0, the decision maker does not pay attention to the interest rate; instead, he
10uses a default interest rate Rd. This interest rate might be the average historical real gross
interest rate. Note also that the Euler equation fails.
To state the model, we assume a prior knowledge of the normal range of variation in the
action, re￿ ected by a variable ￿a, and in the representation, indicated by ￿m. I discuss them
below. For X a random variable, I de￿ne: kXk￿ = E[jXj
￿]
1=￿ for ￿ ￿ 0. Unless speci￿ed
otherwise, I take ￿ = 2.
I assume that the derivatives Vaa and Vam (i.e., the second derivatives with respect to a
and m) are de￿ned at
￿
ad;x;md￿
, and that Vaa is negative de￿nite (which is the case if the
function is locally strictly concave in a).
This paper proposes the following algorithm as a useful model of agents￿behavior. It
may be called the ￿Sparse Boundedly Rational￿algorithm, or ￿Sparse BR￿algorithm for
short.
Algorithm 1 (Sparse BR Algorithm) To solve the problem maxa V (a;x;￿), the sparsity-
seeking decision maker uses the following two steps:
Step 1. Choose an optimally sparse representation of the world. Using the














0 ￿(m ￿ ￿) + ￿[m]: (8)
The ￿rst part is a measure of expected loss from an imperfect model m, while the second part








Step 2. Choose an optimal action. The agent maximizes over the action a:
max
a V (a;x;m) ￿ ￿[a] (10)














11unitless parameters ￿m and ￿a indicate the cost of deviations from the default. When ￿a =
￿m = 0, the decision maker is simply the traditional frictionless agent.
Let me comment on the parts of the model.
First-pass intuition for the model When ￿m = 0, the decision maker￿ s model of
the world is the correct one: m = ￿. When ￿a = 0, the maximization is perfect, conditional
on the model-in-model. Hence, the model continuously includes the traditional model with
no cognitive friction. When cognition costs ￿m are non-zero, the model exhibits inertia and
conservatism: the model-in-model is equal to the default, and so is the action.
For many applications, it might be enough to just turn on either Step 1 or Step 2 of
the model. In most of this paper, only Step 1 will be turned on, i.e., I will assume perfect
maximization given the representation of the world (￿a = 0).
When selecting m, the decision maker uses a quadratic approximation of the
objective function The expression Lquad (m) = 1
2 (m ￿ ￿)
0 ￿(m ￿ ￿) is the quadratic
approximation of the expected loss from an imperfect model m. More speci￿cally, consider
a function V with no x, and a(m) = argmaxa V (a;m), the best action under model m. The
utility loss from using the approximate model m rather than the true model ￿ is L(m) =
V (a(￿);￿) ￿ V (a(m);￿). A Taylor expansion shows that for m close to ￿, L(m) =
Lquad (m) to the leading order.7 This motivates the use of the ￿rst term in (8): it is a
representation of the utility loss from an imperfect representation.
One modeling decision in writing the Sparse BR algorithm is to use Lquad (m) rather than
the exact loss L(m), which would be very complex to use for both the decision maker and the
economist. The decision maker uses a simpli￿ed representation of the loss from inattention.
This is one way to escape Simon￿ s ￿in￿nite regress problem￿￿that optimizing the allocation
of thinking cost can be even more complex than the original problem. I cut that Gordian
knot by assuming a simpler representation of it, namely a quadratic loss around the default.
Finally, in evaluating (7), it is sometimes useful to take the expectation E over the
distribution of x￿ s (as in the quadratic model in Section 2), or to just take the realized values
of x (then, E is simply conditional on x, i.e., it could be suppressed).
7As a solves Va (a;m) = 0, the implicit function theorem gives Vaa￿a+Vam￿m = 0, i.e., ￿a = ￿V ￿1
aa Vam￿m
with ￿m = m ￿ ￿. Hence, the loss is:
L = ￿Va￿a ￿
1
2




0 ￿(m ￿ ￿).
12Defaults The model requires a default action ad and a default representation md. In the
applications below, the default action will be ￿do nothing￿or ￿do as usual￿while the default
representation is ￿do not think about dimension i,￿md
i = 0. This said, richer defaults could
be considered: the literatures on learning and in behavioral economics contain insightful
theorizations of such defaults (Koszegi and Rabin 2006). Social and other processes might
a⁄ect defaults in interesting ways.
Units and scaling Sparsity penalties ￿m and ￿a are unitless numbers. The model has
the correct units: equations (8)-(11) all have the dimensions of V . Also, the equations are
independent of the units in which the components of m and a are measured. For instance,
if jmij does depend on the units of mi, jmijkVmiak does not. More generally, the model is
invariant (for small changes) to reparametrizations of the action: for instance, if the agent
picks consumption or log consumption, the representation chosen by the decision maker is
the same. This adds some robustness and ease of use to the model.
The term Vmia denotes by how much a change in the dimension mi a⁄ects marginal
utility Va (i.e., @Va
@mi). Hence, it is a measure of how important dimension i is. However, the
concept of marginal utility Va is not unit-independent: it has the units of utils divided by
actions. As we do need a unit-independent concept, (9) writes the penalty as Vmia￿a, where
￿a represents the demeaned range of the action a. For instance, if a 2 [0;100], then we could
have ￿a a random variable uniform on [￿50;50]. Written this way, the term Vmia￿a becomes
unit-independent. Variables ￿a and ￿m largely ensure that the model has the right units and
scaling properties. They are typically not crucial in applications. To fully close the model,
the following choices prove sensible: when they are one-dimensional, we can have ￿a = ￿a,
the standard deviation of a. One can typically say that ￿m simply follows the distribution
of ￿, and a follows the distribution of ad (￿;x), for instance.
However, the model is not invariant to the representations of the world m: some will
be better for the agent than others. That is arguably a desirable feature of the model, and
o⁄ers a simple way to model framing. For instance, suppose that w is real wage growth, ￿
in￿ ation, wnom = w + ￿ is nominal wage growth, and that the agent has to guess real wage
growth w. If the agent has access to w (say x1 = w), he will use it, and his problem is simple.
However, if the agent (which is more realistic in many contexts) has only direct access to
nominal wage growth x1 = wnom and in￿ ation x2 = ￿, with say md
1 = 1 and md
2 = 0, then
his task will be harder, and will typically feature an incomplete adjustment for in￿ ation.
Isn￿ t the algorithm complex? The algorithm has been designed to be easy to use
in economic applications. Also, it is not hard to use for the agent. For instance, Step 1
13involves the maximization of a linear-quadratic problem (with an absolute value), and uses
only the properties of the value function around the default. It is still not a completely trivial
task, but it is simpler than the task of the traditional agent. In many cases, it is simply a
collection of nm independent maximization problems, for which the solution can be readily
written down using the ￿ function (as we shall see below).
Step 2 is indeed rather complex, but not really more so than the traditional agent￿ s
problem. In some cases, it is simpli￿ed by the term ￿[a], which anchors many actions at
their default and thus reduces the e⁄ective dimension of the action set to optimize on.
Why is the model set this way? The algorithm is written, ￿rst of all, to have some
descriptive realism. That will be argued in the rest of the paper. Also, it is designed to
have the following properties (for notational simplicity I drop the dependence on x in the
remainder of this section):
(i) It generalizes the loss function of the quadratic problem in Section 2, as we shall soon
see.
(ii) It gives the same answer irrespective of whether the decision maker maximizes
V (a;m) or V (a;m) + B (m) for an arbitrary function B: it should do so because adding
such a number B (m) does not change the problem.
(iii) The model does not depend on third- and higher-order derivatives. This is to keep
the model simple, and in some sense independent (at least locally) of various details like the
third derivatives.
(iv) The model is invariant to the units of the components m and a.
The following proposition, proven in the appendix, says that there is a unique algorithm,
namely the Sparse BR algorithm, that satis￿es the above four criteria. In that sense, the
model is tightly constrained, and equation (9) is rather necessary.






0 ￿(m ￿ ￿) + K ((mi)i=1:::n ;￿a;V;Vm;(Vami)i=1:::n ;Vaa) (12)





(i) (Invariance with the units of m and a, and invariance by rotations of a) The value
of K is unchanged under linear reparametrizations of mi (for i = 1:::nm) and of a: for all
￿i 2 R and A 2 Rna￿na,
K (￿imi;A
0￿a;V;Vm;Vami;Vaa) = K (mi;￿a;V;￿iVmi;￿iAVami;AVaaA
0) (13)
14(ii) (Degree-1 scaling by a¢ ne transformations of V ) Given a real s > 0 and a function
b(m) di⁄erentiable at md, a change V (a;m) ! sV (a;m) + b(m) multiplies K by s.
(iii) (‘1 norm in the basic quadratic problem) When the cost function K is evaluated for
V = ￿1
2 (a1 ￿ m ￿ x)





Then, the penalty of m must be the one in Step 1 of Algorithm 1, i.e.,




Proposition 1 justi￿es in some sense Step 1 of the algorithm. We match the basic
quadratic targeting of the earlier section, and the model satis￿es scale invariance. That
leads to the formulation of ￿[m] in Step 1 of the algorithm.8
Step 2 is justi￿ed, heuristically, by using the idea that penalties for changing one￿ s rep-
resentation and penalties for changing one￿ s action are treated symmetrically. This is why
(11) is simply the rewriting of (9) by changing the roles of actions and representations.
The above might be a formal convenience, or perhaps it might re￿ ect something slightly
deeper in people￿ s decision making: the ￿basic￿algorithm would be given by the penalty
(14), and then the mind would simply use the core algorithm after rescaling for the particular
units of a situation. That leads the mind to the algorithm in (9).
Welfare In behavioral models, the welfare is often hard to assess, e.g., because of the
existence of multiple selves in one agent (Bernheim and Rangel 2009). In the present model,
this is relatively simpler as one might say that ￿fundamental￿utility remains V (a;￿;x), not
V (a;m;x) under the chosen model. Put di⁄erently, if a benevolent advisor were to suggest
perfect default models and actions, the DM would be better o⁄, and would just follow the
advisor.
Potential variants The online appendix discusses some variants that can be useful in
some contexts but that I did not choose for the core model. For instance, rather than to









8Note that the K function cannot depend on Va as this value is generally 0 in the default policy.
15where ￿i would be in utils over the units of mi. This proposal may appear simpler than (9),
but it turns out to be much more problematic to apply in practice: to use (15), at each stage
one needs to take a stance on the value of ￿i for each i. Also, in a dynamic problem involving




t =(1 ￿ ￿)), we should require ￿it to be proportional to
c
1￿￿
t in order to make the model scale-invariant on the balanced growth path. This requires
to set ￿it / c
1￿￿
t more or less manually. On the other hand, the adoption of ￿i = ￿m kVmia￿ak
automatically provides the problem with a sensible scaling. Hence, it confers some parsimony
on the model as there is no decision to make dimension-by-dimension (there is just one key
parameter, ￿m, or, if one wishes, ￿m￿a, which is the same across dimensions mi). At the
same time, we shall see from the consequences of the model that it leads to sensible economic
and psychological results.
This said, it is clear that some tasks (e.g., computing the 100th decimal of
p
2) are much
harder than others; in some economic situations this is an important force, which could be
formulated with a higher ￿i. However, dispensing with that additional degree of freedom
does not signi￿cantly impact the model￿ s economic realism.
Let us now apply the model to a concrete problem, so we can better see how it works.
3.2 Application: Quadratic Target Problem
We detail the application of the model to the quadratic target problem, Example 1. The
online appendix develops Examples 2 and 3. The problem is:
max
a V (a;x;￿); V (a;x;m) =
￿s
2
(a ￿ m ￿ x)
2
where s > 0 indicates the size of stakes and the xi￿ s are uncorrelated with mean 0 and
variances ￿2
i. The agent has access to a vector of information x. Vector m represents the
weights to put on x, whose true value is ￿. Instead, the agent will use V (a;x;m), with
m possibly sparse: mi = 0 corresponds to not thinking about dimension i. The decision
maker￿ s response is as follows (the proof is in the appendix).









































Equation (16) features anchoring on the default value md
i and partial adjustment towards





. For most applications where dimension i is non-salient,
md
i = 0 is probably the right benchmark.
The decision maker does not deviate from the default i⁄
￿ ￿￿i ￿ md
i
￿ ￿￿i < ￿m￿a, i.e., when
dimension i cannot explain more than a fraction (￿m)
2 of the variance of action a. It is the
relative importance of attribute i in decision a that matters for whether or not the decision
maker will pay attention to attribute i, not its absolute importance in terms of, say, a dollar
payo⁄.
The model is scale-invariant in V (e.g., equation 8 is homogenous of degree 1 in V ). As a
result, the total amount of attention concerning decision a is the same whatever the stakes
s. People will pay attention to say 80% of attributes, whether it is for a small decision (e.g.,
buying at the supermarket) or a big decision (e.g., buying a car). I conjecture that this feature
is a good benchmark which would be interesting to evaluate empirically (I do not claim it
will work perfectly, but I conjecture that it will hold more likely than the polar opposite
prediction that people would be 1 million times more precise for a good that costs 1 million
times more). Some evidence consistent with that is presented by Samuelson and Zeckhauser
(1988), who show similar percentage price dispersion between cheap and expensive goods,
and by Tversky and Kahneman (1981): people consider a $5 discount more worthy of an
extra shopping trip if it is for a $15 calculator than for a $125 jacket. Finally, there is casual
evidence that many people do not spend more than 1 hour on retirement planning. Still, in
some cases the scale-independence feature of the model may not be appropriate, and Section
6.1.3 endogenizes ￿ and renders attention more important for more expensive goods.
Equation (17) indicates that when there is more uncertainty about the environment, the




i is higher, a is closer
to ad. In the model, for a given amount of information (m ￿ x), the power of default is
higher when there is more residual uncertainty in the environment. This implication might
be testable in the rich literature on defaults (Madrian and Shea 2001). In general, ￿m is the
amount of model uncertainty for the decision maker, in a way that will be more speci￿c in
examples that are described below.
Calibration We can venture a word about calibration. As a rough baseline, we can
imagine that people will search for information that accounts for at least ￿2 = 10% of the
17variance of the decision, i.e., if j￿ij￿i < ￿￿a. Then, using (16), we ￿nd ￿m ’ ￿. That
leads to the baseline of ￿m ’ 0:3. The reader may ￿nd that, rather than 10%, ￿2 = 1% is
better (though this may be very optimistic about people￿ s attention), which corresponds to
￿m =
p
1% = 0:1 ￿a number still in the same order of magnitude as ￿m ’ 0:3. By the same
heuristic reasoning, we can have as a baseline ￿a ’ 0:3. As it turns out, in subsequent work
(Gabaix 2011), the a-priori calibration ￿m ’ 0:3 works quite well in predicting subject￿ s
behavior in experimental games.
To conclude, the model generates inattention and inertia that respond to the local (i.e.,
for the decision at hand) costs and bene￿ts. We now explore the model￿ s consequences in a
few applications.
4 Some Applications of the Model
4.1 Myopia in an Intertemporal Consumption Choice Problem
The agent has initial wealth w and future income x, he can consume c1 at time 1, and invest
the savings at a gross interest rate R. Hence, the problem is as follows.
Example 4 (2-Period Consumption Problem). Given initial wealth w, solve
max
c1
u(c1) + v (x + R(w ￿ c1))
where income is x = x￿ +
PI
i=1 xi: there are I sources of income xi, and we normalize
E[xi] = 0.
Let us study the solution of this problem with the Sparse BR algorithm. The decision
maker observes the income sources sparsely: he uses the model x(m) = x￿+
PK
i=1 mixi with
mi to be determined. The action is the date-1 consumption c1. We assume u(c) = ￿e￿￿c
and v (c) = ￿e￿￿e￿￿c where ￿ is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion and ￿ the rate of
time preference. The value function is:





mixi + R(w ￿ c1)
!
:
We apply the basic Sparse BR algorithm for the case ￿a = 0 (frictional understanding of
the world, frictionless maximization given that understanding). Calculations in the appendix
show the following proposition.


















with the constant D = Rw +
￿￿lnR
￿ . The marginal propensity to consume (MPC) at time 1





















is the MPC under the zero
cognition cost model (i.e., the traditional model). Hence, in the BR model, unlike in the
traditional model, the marginal propensity to consume is source-dependent.
Di⁄erent income sources have di⁄erent marginal propensities to consume ￿this is remi-
niscent of Thaler￿ s (1985) mental accounts. Equation (19) makes another prediction, namely
that consumers pay more attention to sources of income that usually have large conse-
quences, i.e., have a high ￿xi. Slightly extending the model, it is plausible that a shock to
the stock market does not a⁄ect the agent￿ s disposable income much ￿hence, there will be
little sensitivity to it.9
There is a similarity of this model with models of inattention based on a ￿xed cost
of observing information (Du¢ e and Sun 1990), in particular with the optimal rules of
the allocation of attention developed by Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2010), Gabaix and
Laibson (2002), and Reis (2006). Because of the ￿xed cost, in those models the rules are of
the type ￿look up the information every D periods.￿Those models are relatively complex
(they necessitate many periods and either many agents or complex non-linear boundaries
for the multidimensional s;S rules) whereas the present model is simpler and can be applied
with one or several periods. As a result, the present model, with an equation like (19),
lends itself more directly to empirical testing. The presence of di⁄erent models of boundedly
rational behavior may be helpful for empirical research in that area.
The Euler equation will only hold with the ￿modi￿ed￿ parameters. Hence, we have
Em [Rv0 (c2)=u0 (c1)] = 1, but only using the expectation under model m. Note that it
9In other cases, the default policy might be to consume what is in one￿ s wallet, up to keeping some
minimum amount. Then, the MPC of a dollar bill found on the sidewalk would be 1.
19features underreaction to future news, especially small future news.
4.2 Choosing n Consumption Goods
We next study a basic static consumption problem with n goods.
Example 5 Suppose that the vector of prices is p 2 Rn
++, and the budget is y. The fric-
tionless decision problem is to choose the optimal consumption bundle c 2 Rn: maxc2Rn u(c)
subject to the budget constraint p ￿ c ￿ y.
The price of good i is pd
i + ￿i, where pd
i is the usual price and ￿i is some price change.
The decision maker may pay only partial attention to the price change, and consider the
price of good i to be pd
i + mi. If mi = 0, he proceeds as if the true price were the default
price pd
i, rather than the actual price pd
i + ￿i. For instance, in the experimental setup of
Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009), ￿i could be a tax added to the price.
In this subsection, we study the case where the utility function is quasi-linear in money:
there is a good n (￿money￿ ) with constant marginal utility ￿ and price pd
i = 1. This
assumption will be relaxed in Section 6.1.2. We apply the model of Section 3.1, with an
















If demand depends only on prices,
mi = ￿ (￿i;￿
m￿pi): (21)
Equation (20) says that controlling for the volatility of consumption, inattention is greater
for less elastic goods. The intuition is that for such goods the price is a small component of
the overall purchasing decision (whose range is measured by ￿lnci). Equation (21) indicates
that in order to be remarked, a given price change has to be large as a fraction of the normal
price volatility. It would be insightful to test those predictions. Chetty, Looney, and Kroft
(2009) present evidence for inattention, but do not investigate empirically a relation like (20)
and (21).
204.3 Optimal Monopoly Pricing and BR-Induced Price Stickiness
and Sales
I next study the behavior of a monopolist facing a BR consumer who has the utility function
u(Q;y) = y + Q1￿1= =(1 ￿ 1= ) when he consumes a quantity Q of the good and has a
residual budget y. So, if the price is p, the demand is D(p) = p￿  where   > 1 is the
demand elasticity.10 The consumer uses the Sparse BR algorithm; by the previous analysis,
his demand is:
D









where, by (20), ￿ = ￿mpd￿lnQ= . Hence, the consumer is insensitive to price changes when
p 2 (pd ￿￿;pd +￿).11 The default price pd will be endogenized later to be the average price.
The monopolist picks p to maximize pro￿ts: maxp (p ￿ c)DBR (p) where c is the marginal
cost (in this section, to conform to the notations of the optimal pricing literature, c denotes
a marginal cost rather than consumption). The following proposition describes the optimal
pricing policy.






 ￿1 if c ￿ c1
pd + ￿ if c1 < c ￿ c2
 c￿￿
 ￿1 if c > c2
(23)
where c1 = cd￿2
p
cd￿= +O(￿) solves equation (43), and c2 = cd+￿ with cd := (1￿1= )pd
is the marginal cost that would correspond to the price pd in the model without cognitive
frictions. The pricing function is discontinuous at c1 and continuous elsewhere.
Let us interpret Proposition 5. When p 2
￿
pd ￿ ￿;pd + ￿
￿
, the demand DBR (p) is insen-
sitive to price changes. Therefore, the monopolist will not charge a price p 2
￿
pd ￿ ￿;pd + ￿
￿
:
he will rather charge a price p = pd + ￿. We yield a whole interval of prices that are not
used in equilibrium, and signi￿cant bunching at p = pd +￿. There, the price is independent
10Previous work on rational ￿rms and inattentive consumers includes Heidhues and Koszegi (2010) with
loss-averse consumers, L￿ Huillier (2010) with di⁄erently-informed consumers, and Matejka (2010) with a
Sims (2003)-type entropy penalty. Their models are quite di⁄erent from the one presented here in speci￿c
assumptions and results. Still, there is a common spirit that behavioral consumers can lead to interesting
behavioral by rational ￿rms. A minimo, the present paper o⁄ers a particularly transparent and tractable
version of this theme. Chevalier and Kashyap (2011) o⁄er a theory of price stickiness and sales based on
agents with heterogeneous search costs.
11This is a testable implication: the price elasticity of demand is the smaller the closer the price is to its
default.








Figure 2: Optimal price p set by the monopolist facing boundedly rational consumers, as a
function of the marginal cost c.
of the marginal cost. This is a real ￿stickiness.￿ 12 This e⁄ect is illustrated in Figure 2.13 We
see that a whole zone of prices is not used in equilibrium: there is a gap distribution of price
deviations from the norm.
For low enough marginal cost c, the price falls discretely, like a ￿sale.￿ There is a discrete
jump below the modal price but not above it: the asymmetry is due to the fact that in the
inattention region (pd ￿ ￿;pd + ￿] the ￿rm wishes to set a high price pd + ￿ rather than a
low price. Hence, when we leave the inattention region, the price can rise a bit over pd + ￿,
or otherwise has to jump discretely below pd ￿ ￿.
The cuto⁄ c1 is much more below cd than c2 is above it. It deviates from the baseline cd
proportionally to
p
￿ whereas c2 = cd + ￿.14
This simple model seems to account for a few key stylized facts. Prices are ￿sticky,￿with
a wide range being insensitive to marginal cost. This paper predicts ￿sales:￿a temporary
large fall in the price after which the price reverts to exactly where it was (if c goes back to
(c1;c2)). This type of behavior is documented empirically by Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and
Rebelo (forth.), Kehoe and Midrigan (2010), Klenow and Malin (forth.), and by Goldberg
and Hellerstein (2010), which demonstrates the existence of local-currency price stickiness
and sales in the domestic market of an exporter, consistent with this paper￿ s view of cognitive
frictions coming from the consumer side. In addition, the model says that the typical size of
12If the consumer￿ s default is in nominal terms and mentally adjusting for in￿ ation is costly, this model
can easily yield nominal stickiness.
13The assumed values are   = 6, pd = 8:7, and ￿ = 0:025pd. They imply ￿ = 0:22, cd = 7:25, c1 = 6:16,
c2 = 7:46, p(c1) = 7:43, and p(c2) = 8:92.
14There is also a more minor e⁄ect. For very low marginal cost, consumers do not see that the price is
actually too low: they replace p by p + ￿. Hence, they react less to prices than usually (demand is less
elastic), which leads the monopolist to raise prices. For high marginal cost, consumers replace the price by
p ￿ ￿, so their demand is more elastic, and the price is less than the monopoly price.
22a sales will be p(c2) ￿ p(c1), i.e., to the leading order
p(c2) ￿ p(c1) = 2
s
￿pd
  ￿ 1
(24)
where ￿ = ￿mpd￿lnQ= . Hence, the model makes the testable prediction that the gap in the
distribution of price changes, and the size of sales, is higher for goods with high consumption
volatility and for goods that are less price elastic. The intuition is that for those goods price
is a less important factor in the overall purchasing decision.
To close the model, one needs a theory of the default price. In a stationary environment,









given the distribution over the marginal costs e c. By the implicit function theorem, for
su¢ ciently small ￿ and a smooth non-degenerate distribution of costs, there is a ￿xed point




 ￿1 ￿ + o(￿) with c := E[c]
(the derivations are in the online appendix). Hence, the default price is higher than it would
be in the absence of bounded rationality.
The model is robust to some form of consumer heterogeneity. The key is that the aggre-
gate demand function D(p) has kinks. Hence, if there are, for example, two types of agents
￿two pd
i + ￿i with i 2 f1;2g ￿then we might also expect two reference prices.
This example illustrates that it is useful to have a tractable model, such as the Sparse
BR algorithm, to think about the consequences of bounded rationality in market settings.15
Also, the Sparse BR model is designed to generate inattention in the ￿rst place, not price
stickiness and sales. Rather, it generates a potential new approach to price stickiness as an
unexpected by-product.
4.4 Trading Inertia and Freezes
Step 2 of the Sparse BR algorithm indicates that the decision maker sticks with the default
action when there is more model uncertainty (a higher j￿mj). Let us illustrate that e⁄ect in
the context of trading freezes ￿the stylized fact that in moments of higher uncertainty many
15For instance, much of the analysis will carry over to a closely related setup where consumers are inat-
tentive to the decimal digits of the price, i.e., DBR (n + x) = DBR (n) for n a positive integer and x 2 [0;1).
There will be bunching at a price like $2:99. Likewise, the online appendix solves the model with a ￿xed
cost of thinking. It still yields price rigidity but loses the ￿sales￿e⁄ect: there are two discontinuities in the
optimal price function, rather than one.
23agents simply withdraw from trading.
To be de￿nite, take an agent with logarithmic preferences, selecting his equity share a
(i.e., action a) when the risk premium is ￿ and stock volatility is ￿:






The decision maker is uncertain about the value of ￿ (m). Assume that Step 1 is done
with ￿m = 0 (no friction), but that the decision maker remembers the model uncertainty













Di⁄erentiating in a, ￿ ￿ ￿2a ￿ ￿asign
￿
a ￿ ad￿











We see that, indeed, the portfolio is ￿frozen￿at a = ad whenever
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿d￿
￿ < ￿a￿￿. The
￿freeze￿range is higher when there is more uncertainty ￿￿ about fundamentals.
Trading freezes are often attributed to asymmetric information (lemons style) or Knight-
ian uncertainty (as in Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2008), but here trading freezes come
from bounded rationality.
4.5 Endowment E⁄ect
The model generates an endowment e⁄ect alongside some additional predictions. Call a 2
[0;1] the quantity of mugs owned (the prototypical good used by Kahneman, Knetsch and
Thaler 1990), x ￿ 0 the (random) utility for having a costless mug, and p the mug price.
Net utility is V (a;x) = a(x ￿ p), and the decision problem is maxa2[0;1] V (a;x) = a(x ￿ p).
Using Step 2 of the Sparse BR algorithm (equation 11), the problem is:
max
a2[0;1]
a(E[x] ￿ p) ￿ ￿
a￿x
￿ ￿a ￿ a
d￿ ￿
where ￿x = k￿xk is the uncertainty about x.
The solution is simple and yields the willingness to pay (WTP) as well as the willingness
to accept (WTA) for the mug. If ad = 0 (i.e., the agent does not already own the mug), the
solution is to buy i⁄ p ￿ WTP = E[x] ￿ ￿a￿x. If ad = 1 (i.e., the agent already owns the
mug), the solution is to sell i⁄ E[x] ￿ WTA = E[x] + ￿a￿x. The discrepancy between the
24two,
WTA ￿ WTP = 2￿
a￿x; (27)
is the endowment e⁄ect. In contrast, with loss aversion, the discrepancy is
WTA ￿ WTP = (￿ ￿ 1)E[x] (28)
where ￿ ’ 2 is the coe¢ cient of loss aversion. (With loss aversion ￿, selling the good creates
a loss of ￿E[x] whereas getting it creates a gain of only E[x].)
Hence, this paper￿ s approach predicts that the endowment e⁄ect is increasing in the
uncertain subjective utility (￿x) of a good.
There is some consistent evidence: for instance, there is no endowment e⁄ect for, say,
dollar bills which have a known hedonic value. Liersch et al. (2011) ￿nd a large endowment
e⁄ect when extra noise (corresponding to a higher ￿x in the model) is added. Cao et al. (2011)
obtain a related prediction in a Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) type of setting, and propose
that it helps understand a variety of behavioral ￿nance phenomena. Finally, professional
traders (List 2003) do not exhibit an endowment e⁄ect ￿according to this theory, that is
because the value of the good is known.
To conclude, we have seen that the same model can shed light on a variety of situations
and propose comparative statics for them: the determinants of inattention to prices, price
rigidity, trading inertia and freezes, and the endowment e⁄ect. We can now turn to two
other rather di⁄erent uses of the model.
5 Other Consequences of Sparsity-seeking Simpli￿ca-
tion
I now show two fairly di⁄erent instances of the theme that the decision maker simpli￿es
reality to make decisions.
5.1 Dictionaries and Stereotypical Thinking
One particular interpretation of m is potentially interesting. Following the image processing






Note that the dictionary might be ￿redundant,￿i.e., xi (mi) need not form a basis. For
25instance, take a geometrical example and the plane R2. We could have: x1 (￿;￿;R) a circle
with center (￿;￿) and radius R (the index is in R3); x2 (￿;￿;￿0;￿0) a square starting with
two ￿top￿edges (￿;￿) and (￿0;￿0) (the index is then in R4). The total ￿gure is the sum of
all those primitive ￿gures. We describe a picture from the basic constituents.
In a more social setting, we could denote by x an n-dimensional vector of attributes such
as profession, nationality, income, social background, ethnicity, gender, height, etc. Then,
the primitive words in the dictionary could be xEng for a stereotypical engineer, xAsian for an
Asian person, etc.
The key is that it is simple (sparse) to think in terms of ￿ready-made￿categories, but
harder (less sparse) to think in terms of a mix of categories. For instance, suppose that
attributes are x = (y1;y2), where y1 is how good the person is at mathematics and y2 is
how good she is at dancing. Say that there exists a ￿type￿engineer with characteristics
xEng = (8;￿3), i.e., engineers are quite good at math, but are rather bad dancers (on
average). Take a person called Johanna. First, we are told she is an engineer, and the ￿rst
representation is xJ = xEng. Next, we are told she is actually a good dancer, with level +4
in dancing. Her characteristics are xJ = (8;4). How will she be remembered? We could say
x(m) = xEng + mxDancer where xDancer = (0;1), but full updating to m = ￿ = 7 is costly.
Hence, the information ￿good dancer￿may be discarded, and only xEng will be remembered.
The ￿stereotype￿of the engineer eliminates the information that she is a good dancer.
More precisely, suppose that one wishes to maximize V = ￿(a1 ￿ x1)
2 ￿ ￿ (a2 ￿ x2)
2,
i.e., have a good model of the person with a weight ￿ on the dancing ability. We start





(it is clear that the ￿rst dimension
need not change). Applying the algorithm, we have maxm ￿1
2￿ (a2 ￿ m2)
2￿￿￿a2￿
￿ ￿m2 ￿ xd
2
￿ ￿.









x2 = ￿3 + ￿ (7;￿￿a2):
Thus, we get partial adjustment, with x2 between the stereotypical level of dancing (￿3)
and Johanna￿ s true level (4).
Hence, a model of sparsity-seeking thinking with a dictionary would be the following.
Given a situation x 2 Rnx, ￿nd a sparse representation that approximates x well, e.g., ￿nd
the solution to:
min









Then, people will remember x(m) =
P
i2I xi (mi) rather than the true x. This generates a
simpli￿cation of the picture, using simple traits. The above may be a useful mathematical
26model of categorization. For instance, we might arrive at a model of ￿￿rst impressions
matter.￿The ￿rst impression determines the initial category. Then, by the normal inertia
in this model, opinions are adjusted only partially. I note that some of these e⁄ects can be
obtained in other models of categorization (Mullainathan 2001, Fryer and Jackson 2008).
An advantage here is that categorization comes naturally from a general model of sparsity.
It is also clear that it is useful to have a dictionary of such stereotypes: they make thinking
or, at the very least, remembering sparser. One may also speculate that education and life
events provide decision makers with new elements in their dictionaries, and that as some
dictionaries are more helpful to face new situations than others, ￿habits of thoughts￿and
￿cultural references￿might be usefully modeled by dictionaries.
5.2 Simpli￿cation of Random Variables
5.2.1 Formalism
Consider a random variable Y with values in Rn. In his model-in-model, the decision maker
might replace it with a random variable X that is ￿simpler￿in some sense.
(i) X might have a di⁄erent, arguably simpler distribution: for instance, we could replace
a continuous distribution with a one-point distribution (e.g., X = E[Y ] with probability 1)
or with a two-point distribution X = E[Y ] ￿ m. We could even have X to be a certainty
equivalent of Y .
(ii) X might have independent components. For example, we could have Xi
d = Yi, but
the components (Xi)i=1:::n are independent while the components (Yi)i=1:::n are not.
To formalize (i), call F and G the CDFs of X and Y , respectively. Then, U = G(Y ) has
a uniform [0;1] distribution, and we can de￿ne X = F ￿1 (U) with the same U, so that X
and Y are maximally a¢ liated.16
The choice of the model is subject to the same cost-bene￿t principles as in the rest of
















16To formalize (ii), it is useful to use the machinery of copulas. For an n-dimensional vector Y , let















dC (u1;:::;un). In the simpli￿ed distribution, the marginals G
￿1
i and the copula









, where the U0
i￿ s have the
copula of independent variables, C￿ (u1;:::;un) = u1 ￿￿￿un. If we wish to have Xi￿ s marginals to be simpler












(Y ￿ X (m))
2
i
is the (squared) Wasserstein distance between the distributions of Y and
X (m), which has many good properties.
27Eyster and Weizs￿cker (2010) present experimental evidence for correlation neglect, i.e.,
the use of simpli￿cation (ii). The next example illustrates the possible relevance of simpli￿-
cation (i).
5.2.2 Application: Acquiring-a-company Game
Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) propose the following ingenious problem.
Example 6 (Acquiring-a-company) The company is worth Y (uniformly distributed on [0;100])
to Ann, and worth 1:5Y to you (you are a better manager than Ann). You can make a take-
it-or-leave-it o⁄er a to Ann, who knows Y . What o⁄er do you make?
In addition, the experimental setup makes sure that ￿Ann￿is a computer, so that its
answer can be assumed to be rational. Before reading the next paragraph, interested readers
are encouraged to solve (without paper and pencil) Example 6 for themselves.
Experimentally, subjects respond with a mode around 60 and a mean around 40 (Charness
and Levin 2009). However, the rational solution is a = 0. This is an extreme case of
asymmetric information (related to the winner￿ s curse).
Let us generalize the problem and state the BR solution to it. Assume that the company









company is worth (￿ ￿ 1)Y > 0 more to the decision maker than to Ann. Hence, in the
original problem Y = 0;Y = 100, and ￿ = 1:5.
Let us see how to state the model-in-model. We will see how, if the agent uses a simpler
representation of probabilities, we account for the non-zero experimental value. This is
a di⁄erent explanation from existing ones (Eyster and Rabin 2005, Crawford and Iriberri
2007) which emphasize the assumption that the other player is irrational whereas the decision
maker is rational. However, there is no ￿other player￿in this game, as it is just a computer,
and then those models predict a bid of 0 (Charness and Levin 2009).
The agent uses a representation of the dispersion in values, X (m), simpler than the true
distribution, Y . For instance, the agent might form a model of the situation by simplifying
the distribution and replacing it by a distribution with point mass X (0) = E[Y ]. Then,
the best response is a = E[Y ], which is 50 in the basic game. This is not too far from the
empirical evidence.





X (m) = E[Y ] ￿ m with equal probability, for some m 2 [0;￿] with ￿ ￿ E[Y ]￿Y =
Y ￿ E[Y ] (we leave it to be an empirical matter to see what m is ￿the same way it is
an empirical matter to see what the local risk aversion is). Given this model, the agent
28maximizes V (a;m) = E
￿
(￿X (m) ￿ a)1X(m)￿a
￿
. The resulting action is stated here and
derived in the appendix.















as long as ￿ < 3, and a￿ = E[Y ] + m otherwise. In particular, in the basic problem with




50 + m if m 2 [0;16:66:::]
50 ￿ m if m 2 (16:66:::;50]
:
On the other hand, the model does not explain parts of the results in the Charness and
Levin (2009) experiments. In a design where the true distribution of X is 0 or 1 with equal
probability, the rational choice is a = 0. However, subjects￿choices exhibit two modes: one
very close to a = 0 and another around a = 1. The model explains the ￿rst mode but not
the second one. It could be enriched to account for that additional randomness, but that
would take us too far a￿eld. One useful model is the contingency-matching variant in the
online appendix: with equal probability, the decision maker predicts that the outcome will
be 0 or 1, and best-responds to each event by playing 0 and 1 with equal probability. Hence,
reality seems to be reasonably well accounted for by a mixture of the basic model and its
contingencies-matching actions. All in all, the model is useful to describe behavior in the
basic acquiring-a-company game even though it does not account for all the patterns in the
other variants.
6 Complements and Discussion
6.1 Some Extensions of the Model
This subsection presents extensions of the Sparse BR algorithm that may be useful in some
situations.
6.1.1 Discrete Actions
The model is formulated with a Euclidean action space, which is the substrate in many
economic problems and confers a nice structure (e.g., a metric) on them. It extends to a
discrete action space, as I illustrate here; the online appendix provides further details.
29Action a 2 f1;::::;Ag generates utility V (a;x;￿) of which the agent may use an imperfect
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a;x;md￿￿ ￿, so that ￿m
i is analogous to kVmia￿ak in Algorithm
1: it is the typical size of the marginal enrichment mi. De￿ne ￿V =
￿ ￿￿￿aV (a;x;￿)
￿ ￿, a
scale for the dispersion in values across actions, which is analogous to k￿aVaa￿ak in the main






































Step 2 is simply maxa V (a;m￿;x) in the baseline case with ￿a = 0, and we can have a soft
maximum otherwise, e.g., the probability pa of picking a could be pa = e￿V (a;m￿;x)=
P
a0 e￿V (a;m￿;x)
with ￿ > 0 (this is further discussed in Gabaix 2011).






with the xia￿ s i.i.d. across goods a, normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviations
￿i. The dimensions i 2 f1;:::;ng are (normalized) hedonic dimensions, e.g., price, weight,
usefulness, esthetical appeal of each good. The default is md = 0. Applying the above Step
1￿ , we obtain ￿m
i = ￿i and ￿nally:
Proposition 7 Suppose that the agent chooses among A goods where good a 2 f1:::Ag has
value V (a;￿;x) =
Pn


















Hence, we obtain a dimension-by-dimension dampening, with small dimensions (small ￿i)
dampened more or fully, very much in the spirit of the initial example we started from, but
for discrete actions. Compared to process models of discrete choice with partial attention
(e.g., Payne, Bettman and Johnson 1993, Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche and Weinberg 2006),
30this model eschews sequential search (which typically does not lead to a closed form for the
perceived value) and is thus much more tractable. Indeed, an equation such as (31) could
be fairly directly estimated: when ￿m = 0, it is the rational actor model, while for ￿m ! 1
the agent is fully inattentive. Empirical agents are likely to be in between.
6.1.2 Model with Constraints
We extend the model, so that it handles maximization under constraints. The decision maker
wishes to solve:
max
a V (a;x;￿) subject to B
k (a;x;￿) ￿ 0 for k = 1:::K: (32)
For instance, B1 could be a budget constraint, B1 = y ￿ p(￿) ￿ c where p(￿) is a vector of
prices under the true model ￿. As usual, we assume that V and ￿Bk are concave in a.
We use Lagrange multipliers to formulate the extension of the model to constraints.
Algorithm 2 (Sparse BR Algorithm with Constraints) To solve the problem in (32), the
agent uses the following three steps.
1. Transformation into an unconstrained problem. Select the Lagrange multiplier ￿￿ 2 RK












2. BR-solve the new, unconstrained problem. Use the Sparse BR algorithm 1 for the value
function V ￿ de￿ned as:
V
￿ (a;x;m) := V (a;x;m) + ￿
￿ ￿ B (a;x;m)
without constraints. That returns a representation m and an action a.
3. Adjustment to take the constraints fully into account. Call b = (V ￿
aa)
￿1 Ba the na ￿ K
adjustment matrix and, for a vector of weights ￿ 2 RK, a(￿) = a + b￿. Pick a ￿ that
ensures that the K budget constraints are satis￿ed (typically, there is just one such ￿,
but otherwise take the utility-maximizing one).
Step 1 of Algorithm 2 picks a Lagrange multiplier ￿￿, using the default representation md.
This way, in Step 2 we can de￿ne a surrogate value function V ￿ that encodes the importance
of the constraints by their Lagrange multipliers: V ￿ can be maximized without constraints,
so that the basic Sparse BR algorithm can be applied.
31The resulting recommended action may not respect the budget constraint. Hence, Step 3
adjusts the recommended action, so that all budget constraints are satis￿ed. The form a(￿)
chosen is the linear form that returns the right answer to the benchmark case where ￿ = 0,
as developed in Lemma 3 of the online appendix. Again, the model is in that sense quite
constrained. The interpretation of action b is easiest to see in the case of just one budget
constraint: suppose that there is a small income shock ￿y, so that the budget constraint
becomes B (a) + ￿y ￿ 0. Then, to the ￿rst order, the optimal action is ￿a = b￿ for some
￿ that ensures that the budget constraint is binding (Ba￿a + ￿y = 0, so ￿ = ￿(B0
ab)
￿1 ￿y):
action b is proportional to @a=@y, the marginal response of the action to a change in income.
As an illustration, let us revisit the basic problem of maximizing a utility function subject
to a budget set, which was developed in Section 4.2 by assuming a linear utility for residual
money but which we can now solve with a budget constraint. Recall that the true vector of
prices is p = pd+￿ and the problem is maxc2Rn u(c) subject to y￿p￿c ￿ 0. So, V (c) = u(c),





In Step 1, we pick the Lagrange multiplier ￿￿ that corresponds to the problem: maxc u(c)+
￿
￿
y ￿ pd ￿ c
￿
under the default price vector pd. Then, we de￿ne:
V














This gives us a quasi-linear utility function, with linear utility for residual money.
Step 2 is as in Section 4.2, and yields a representation m (given by (20)) and as action




. In Step 3 (applied with cd = 0), the decision maker picks








=@y, and the scale factor ￿ 2 R ensures
that the budget constraint holds: ￿ = (y ￿ p ￿ c)=(p ￿ b). Psychologically, the decision maker
thinks ￿I missed my budget by ￿y dollars, so I am going to make the regular adjustment
￿c = b￿y to that change in income in order to match by budget constraint.￿In that sense,
the algorithm has a commonsensical psychological interpretation.
6.1.3 Cognitive Overload and Decisions under Stress
I present a way to model ￿cognitive overload￿and the impact of decisions under stress.18 This
may be useful for analyzing bad decisions of people under stress, e.g., very poor individuals
with di¢ cult accidents in their lives or ￿nanciers in hectic markets (Hirshleifer, Lim, and
Teoh 2009).
A slight and natural generalization of the Sparse BR model is required. Step 1 of the
18I thank Abhijit Banerjee for suggesting this application.






0 ￿(m ￿ ￿) + ￿0￿ (34)





￿ ￿mi ￿ m
d
i
￿ ￿ ￿ C (35)
where ￿ ￿ 0 is a measure of ￿cognitive leisure￿(e.g., how much time is left to enjoy oneself
rather than to think about decisions), ￿0 is the value of leisure in utils, and C is the decision
maker￿ s cognitive capacity.
In (34), the ￿rst term is the loss due to an imperfect model m while the second term ￿0￿
is the enjoyment of cognitive leisure.19 The budget constraint (35) re￿ ects that the cognitive
capacity C is allocated between cognitive leisure ￿ and the cost of processing mi.







￿i (mi ￿ ￿i)















where ￿ and ￿ are the Lagrange multipliers associated with (35) and ￿ ￿ 0, respectively.
Maximizing over ￿, we have ￿0 ￿ ￿ + ￿ = 0, i.e., if ￿ > 0, ￿ = ￿0, and ￿ > ￿0 otherwise.












When the cost of cognition ￿ increases, the quality of decisions falls. To see this more
analytically, consider the case where the decision maker has to make n decisions with the
same ￿i = ￿, ￿i = ￿, ￿i = ￿ > 0 for all i, md
i = 0, and the decisions are important enough,
so that ￿￿ > ￿. Let us vary the number of decisions to be made (which is a way to model
periods of stress) while keeping the cognitive capacity constant.


















, the quality of decision making for each
problem declines with the total number of problems n.
19The units of ￿0 and ￿i are in utils, so we might have ￿0 = k￿aWaa￿ak to get a de￿nite value for ￿0.
33Hence, in situations of extreme stress (n > n￿), the performance of all decisions declines
because the decision maker hits his cognitive capacity.
Note that the formulation (34)-(35) may be useful in other domains. In particular,
relaxing ￿i = ￿m kVmia￿ak may be useful when some dimensions are signi￿cantly harder to
think about than others. For instance, a ￿salient￿dimension could be modeled as having
a lower ￿i. When the decision maker thinks about a dimension, the fact that ￿ and ￿i
enter multiplicatively in (36) implies that the impact of salience is greater under a higher
cognitive load. Finally, if the poor lead more stressful lives and therefore have a depleted
amount of cognition C, then the quality of their decision making is hampered and they are
likely poorer as a result. Hence, we may have multiple equilibria, like in the poverty traps
discussed in development economics. Currie (2009) reviews evidence that poor health leads
to lower human capital (corresponding to a proxy for a higher ￿ in the model). Banerjee and
Mullainathan (2010) document the hypothesis that the poor are more subject to behavioral
biases, and derive some of its implications.
6.1.4 Diagonal Simpli￿cation for ￿
The following simpli￿cation is sometimes useful. Rather than ￿ de￿ned in (7), use a diagonal
matrix with diagonal elements ￿i instead:
￿













































The intuition is as follows. For each dimension mi, select the ￿key action￿that is related




, in virtue of Footnote 7. The term ￿diag is
simple to calculate, and does not involve the matrix inversion of the general ￿ in (7).






34if i = k, and 0 otherwise. Hence, the key action corresponding to the price mi is the
consumption of the good ci. Therefore, ￿diag = ￿2diag (￿1=ucici), which is simple to use.
Without the key action, the cross partials ucicj matter‘ and things are more complex to
derive for the paper-and-pencil economist, and also perhaps for the decision maker.
6.2 Links with Themes of the Literature
6.2.1 Links with Themes in Behavioral Economics
In this section, I discuss the ways in which the Sparse BR approach meshes with themes in
behavioral economics: it draws from them, and is a framework to think about them.
Anchoring and adjustment The model exactly features anchoring and adjustment
for expectations and decisions: the anchor is the default model-in-model md and action ad,
the adjustment is dictated by the circumstances. In this way, the model is a complement to
other models; for instance, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) model what ￿comes to mind￿to
the decision maker, so that their work is a model of md, while the present model is about
how the decision maker deviates from that simpli￿ed model md.
Power of defaults Closely related to anchoring and adjustment, it has now been well
established that default actions are very often followed even in the ￿eld (Madrian and Shea
2001, Carroll et al. 2009). This model prominently features that stylized fact.
Rules of thumb Rules of thumb are rough guides to behavior, such as ￿invest 50/50
in stocks and bonds,￿￿save 15% of your income,￿or ￿consume the dividend but not the
principal￿(Baker, Nagel, and Wurgler 2007). They are easily modeled as default actions ad.
The advantage is that the Sparse BR model generates deviations from the rule (the default
action) when the circumstances call for it with enough force: for instance, if income is very
low, the agent will see that the current marginal utility is very high, and he should save less.
Temptation vs BR The present model is about bounded rationality, rather than
￿emotions￿such as hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 1997) or temptation. Following various
authors (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine 2006, Brocas and Carillo 2008), we can imagine an
interesting connection, though, operationalized via defaults. Suppose that System 1 (Kah-
neman 2003), the emotional and automatic system, wants to consume now. This could be
modeled as saying that System 1 resets the default action to high consumption now (it will
likely also shift the default representation). System 2, the cold analytical system, operates
like the Sparse BR model. It partially overrides the default when cognition costs are low,
35but will tend to follow it otherwise. While many papers have focused on modeling System
1, this paper attempts to model System 2.
Mental accounts Some of the above has a ￿ avor of ￿mental accounts￿(Thaler 1985).
For instance, in Section 4.1, the marginal propensity to consume out of income is source-
dependent.
Availability The theory is silent about the cost ￿m
i of each dimension, which is constant
at ￿m in the benchmark model. It is, however, plausible that more ￿available￿dimensions
will have a lower ￿m
i . For instance, availability is greater when a variable is large, familiar,
and frequently used.
Endowment e⁄ect The model generates an endowment e⁄ect (cf. Section 4.5), with
the additional feature (compared to the common explanation based on prospect theory) that
the better understood the good the lower the endowment e⁄ect.
1=n heuristics This heuristic (Bernatzi and Thaler 2001, Huberman and Jian 2006) is
to allocate an amount 1=n when choosing over n plans, irrespective of the plans￿correlation:
for instance, the agent allocates 1=3;1=3;1=3, no matter whether the o⁄ering is one bond
fund and two stock funds or one stock fund and two bond funds. The model can generate
this by using the ￿simpli￿cation of variables￿(cf. Section 5.2). Here, the simpli￿cation would
be that the variables are treated as independent (or i.i.d.) rather than correlated.
6.2.2 Links with Other Approaches to Bounded Rationality and Inattention
This paper is another line of attack on the polymorphous problem of bounded rationality
(see surveys in Conslik 1996 and Rubinstein 1998). The present paper is best viewed as
a complement rather than a substitute for existing models. For instance, there is a vast
literature on learning (Sargent 1993, Fudenberg and Levine 2009) that sometimes generates
a host of stylized facts because agents may not set up their models optimally (Fuster, Laibson,
and Mendel 2010). One could imagine joining those literatures in a model of ￿sparse learning￿
where the agent pays attention only to a subset of the world and thus perhaps learns only
partially about the world.
This said, some of the most active themes are the following.20
20I omit many models here, in particular ￿process￿ models, e.g., Bolton and Faure-Grimaud (2009),
Compte and Postlewaite (2011), Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche, and Weinberg (2006), and MacLeod (2002).
They are instructive conceptually and descriptively, but yield somewhat complex mappings between situa-
tions and outcomes.
36Limited understanding of strategic interactions. In several types of models, the BR comes
from the interactions between the decision maker and other players, see Eyster and Rabin￿ s
(2005) cursed equilibrium, JØhiel￿ s (2005) analogy-based equilibrium, k-level of thinking
models surveyed in Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri (2010), and the related work of
Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004).21 These models prove very useful for capturing naivetØ
about strategic interactions, e.g., the winner￿ s curse in auctions or beauty contests. However,
they can only be one part (albeit an important one) of the problem of BR: indeed, in a single-
person context, they model the decision maker as fully rational. In contrast, in the present
paper the decision maker is boundedly rational even in isolation.
Decisions within " of the maximal utility. The near-rational approach of Akerlof and
Yellen (1985) is based on the premise that agents will tolerate decisions that make them lose
some " utility, and still proves useful for empirical work (e.g., Chetty 2009). However, it
implies that the decision maker￿ s action will fall in a band (that gives him close to maximal
utility), but it does not yield de￿nite predictions about what actions the decision maker will
take. This is in contrast to this paper.
Inattention and information acquisition. This paper is also related to the literature on
modeling inattention (see Veldkamp 2011 for a comprehensive survey). There are several
ways to model inattention. One strand of that literature uses ￿xed costs (Du¢ e and Sun
1990, Gabaix and Laibson 2002, Mankiw and Reis 2002, Reis 2006). I have argued that
a key bene￿t of this paper￿ s approach, with the ‘1 penalty, is the tractability it confers.
Another in￿ uential proposal made by Sims (e.g., in 2003) is to use an entropy-based penalty.
This has the advantage of a nice foundation; however, it leads to non-deterministic models
(agents take stochastic decisions), and the modeling is very complex when it goes beyond
the linear-Gaussian case. The Sparse BR model presents some important di⁄erences. One
is that the model generates sparsity. Another is that the model is deterministic: in a given
situation, ex-ante identical agents remain identical ex post. This makes the analysis much
simpler.
Uncertainty aversion and concern for robustness. Hansen and Sargent (2007) have shown
that many consequences (e.g., prudent allocation to stocks) stem from the assumption that
the agents understand that they do not know the right model and have concerns for ￿ro-
bustness,￿which they model as optimization under the worse potential model. In contrast,
the decision maker is biased towards simplicity, not pessimism, in the present model.
It may be interesting to note that while all those frameworks are inspired by psychology,
21See also models of naive hyperbolic discounting (O￿ Donoghue and Rabin 1999, DellaVigna and Mal-
mendier 2004). Relatedly, an interesting literature studies BR in organizations (e.g., Radner and Van Zandt
2001), and aims at predictions on the level of large organizations rather than individual decision making.
See also MadarÆsz and Prat (2010) for a recent interesting advance in BR in a strategic context.
37some are also inspired by modeling advances in applied mathematics. The Sims framework
is based on Shannon￿ s information theory of the 1940s. The Hansen-Sargent framework is
in￿ uenced by the engineering literature of the 1970s. The present framework is inspired
by the sparsity-based literature of the 1990s-2000s (Tibshirani 1996, CandŁs and Tao 2006,
Donoho 2006, Mallat 2009), which shows that sparsity has many properties of tractability
and near-optimality.22 The present paper is the ￿rst paper in economic theory to use the
recent sparsity-based literature from statistics.
7 Conclusion
This paper proposes a tractable model with some boundedly rational features. Its key con-
tribution is to formulate a tractable version of the costs and bene￿ts of thinking (captured
as an enrichment of the agent￿ s mental model). On the bene￿t side, the decision maker
uses a quadratic approximation of his utility function, which circumvents Simon￿ s in￿nite-
regress problem. On the cost side, the decision maker uses an ‘1 norm to obtain sparsity and
tractability (drawn from a recent literature in applied mathematics), with feature-speci￿c
weights that make the model largely invariant to many changes in scales, units, and repara-
metrization. This formulation leads to linear-quadratic problems (with a sparsity-inducing
absolute value) which are easy to solve in many cases of interest. At the same time, it ar-
guably features some psychological realism: we all simplify reality when thinking about it,
and this model represents one way to do that ￿indeed, it is the simplest tractable way that
I could devise.
The simplicity of the core model allows for the formulation of a BR version of a few
important building blocks of economics. For instance, we can study BR-optimal choice of
consumption bundles (the agent has an imperfect understanding of prices); and BR asset
allocation (with inertia and trading freezes). The model leads to a theory of price rigidity
based on stickiness in the consumer￿ s mind, rather than stickiness in the price-setting tech-
nology of ￿rms. In ongoing work, I formulate a way to do BR dynamic programming, where
the agent builds on a simpli￿ed model with few state variables.
No doubt, the model could and should be greatly enriched. In the present work, there is
simply a lone agent. In work in progress, I extend the model to include multi-agent models
and the limited understanding of general equilibrium e⁄ects by agents. In addition, the
model is silent about some di¢ cult operations such as Bayesian (or non-Bayesian) updating
22For instance, somewhat miraculously, one can do a regression with fewer observations than regressors (like
in genetics, or perhaps growth empirics) by assuming that the number of non-zero regressors is sparse and




i=1 (yi ￿ ￿0xi)
2+￿k￿k1.
38and learning (see Gennaioli and Shleifer 2010 for recent progress in that direction), and
memory management (Mullainathan 2002).
Indeed, the model is a complement rather than a substitute for other models: one could as
well devise a model of BR learning or robustness with a sparsity constraint. Those extensions
are left to future research (e.g., Gabaix 2011). However, despite these current limitations,
given its tractability and fairly good generality, the Sparse BR model might be a useful tool
for thinking about the impact of bounded rationality in economic situations.
8 Proof Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We need the following lemmas. Here, n and p are positive
integers, and S is a set.
Lemma 2 (a) Consider a function f : Rn ￿ Rn￿p ! S such that for all x 2 Rn, y 2 Rn￿p,
and A 2 Rn￿n, f (Ax;y) = f (x;A0y). Then, there exists a function g : Rp ! S such that
f (x;y) = g (x0y). (b) Consider a function f : Rn ￿ Rn￿p ￿ Rn￿n ! S such that for all
x 2 Rn, y 2 Rn￿p;z 2 Rn￿n, and A 2 Rn￿n, f (Ax;y;z) = f (x;A0y;x;A0zA). Then, there
exists a function g : Rp ￿ R ! S such that f (x;y;z) = g (x0y;x0zx).
Proof . Let us prove (b), which is more general than (a). De￿ne e1 = (1;0n￿1)
0 and, for
a row vector Y 2 Rp and a scalar Z 2 R, g (Y;Z) := f (e1;e1Y;e1Ze0
1). We have:
















Hypothesis (ii) implies that K is independent of the values V and Vm evaluated at the
default. Hence, one can write K ((mi)i=1:::n ;￿a;(Vami)i=1:::n ;Vaa) for some function K (by a
minor abuse of notation).
We use the invariance to reparametrization ￿1 in hypothesis (i), and apply Lemma 2(a)
to K (m1;Vam1;Z1) where Z1 represents the other arguments. This implies that we can write
K (m1;Vam1;Z1) = K (m1Vam1;Z1) for a new function K. Proceeding the same way for
(mi;Vami) for i = 2:::n, we see that we can write K = K (￿a;(miVami)i=1:::n ;Vaa). We next
apply Lemma 2(b) to x = ￿a and y = (miVami)i=1:::nm ;z = Vaa. It implies that we can write:
K = k
￿





39for some function k : Rnm ￿ R ! R.
Let us next use assumption (iii). When kxik and k￿a1k are non-zero, de￿ne b xi = xi=kxik,
b a1 = a1=k￿a1k, b ￿a1 = ￿a1=k￿a1k, and b mi = mi kxikk￿a1k. Then, the problem associ-
ated with (b a1;￿b a1;b xi; b mi) has kb xik = 1 and k￿b a1k = 1. Hypothesis (iii) indicates that
k ((b ￿a1b xib mi)i=1:::n) = ￿m P
i jb mij. Hence:
k ((￿a1ximi)i=1:::n ;1) = k ((b ￿a1b xib mi)i=1:::n) = ￿
m X
i




This implies that k ((y)i=1:::n ;1) = ￿m P
i kyik. Using the homogeneity of degree 1 part of
(ii), we have that




















jmijkVmia ￿ ￿ak. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2 By homogeneity, it is enough to consider the case s = 1.
Step 1: Representation. We calculate
Va = ￿a + m ￿ x; Vm = x(a ￿ m ￿ x)
Vaa = ￿1; Vam = x; Vami = xi
so when x is one-dimensional, ￿ = ￿E[VamV ￿1
aa Vam] = E[x2]. With n dimensions for m,






￿ ￿mi ￿ m
d
i
￿ ￿kVmia￿ak = ￿
m X
i











with Ki ￿ ￿m￿a￿i.


















We use Lemma 1, which gives (16).
40Step 2: Approximate maximization. We calculate ￿[a] from equation (11):
￿[a] = ￿
a ￿ ￿a ￿ a
d￿ ￿kVam￿mk = ￿
a ￿ ￿a ￿ a
d￿ ￿kx ￿ ￿mk = ￿







￿ ￿a ￿ a
d￿ ￿:
Step 2 gives: maxa ￿1
2 (a ￿ m ￿ x)
2 ￿ Q
￿ ￿a ￿ ad￿ ￿. This yields a = ad + ￿
￿




Proof of Proposition 3. We calculate:
Vc1 = u
0 (c1) ￿ v
0 (c2)R; Vc1c1 = u
00 (c1) + v
00 (c2)R
2; Vc1mi = ￿v
00 (c2)Rxi:



































. Hence, the solution is:





























we have V d




(1 + R), so (41) gives:
￿i =
￿m (1 + R)￿c1
￿xi
:







which gives e￿￿c1 ￿ e￿￿e￿￿(x(m)+R(w￿c1))R = 0 and
c1 = x(m) + R(w ￿ c1) +
￿ ￿ lnR
￿

























Proof of Proposition 4 We calculate:






; Vcicj = uij; Vcimj = ￿￿1i=j:
Hence, the components of the loss matrix are ￿ii = ￿2
￿uii in two cases: namely, if the utility
function is separable in the goods (u(c) =
P
i ui (ci)) or, for a non-separable utility function,
if we apply the ￿key action￿enrichment developed below in Section 6.1.4 (the key action
corresponding to pi is ci).

































Using ui = ￿pi and calling  i = ui=(￿ciuii) the price elasticity of demand of good i, we
obtain (20).
To proceed further, we examine the case where preferences are separable, so the f.o.c.
ui (ci) = ￿pi implies that a change in price dpi implies uiidci = ￿dpi, and thus juiij￿ci = ￿￿pi.
Equation (21) follows.
Proof of Proposition 5. The monopolist solves
max









Consider ￿rst the interior solutions with p = 2
￿
pd ￿ ￿;pd + ￿
￿









= 1, and the f.o.c.
is p ￿ "￿ ￿   (p ￿ c) = 0, i.e.,
p = p
int ￿
 c ￿ "￿









 c ￿ "￿
  ￿ 1
￿ c
￿￿
 c ￿ "￿







  ￿ 1
￿1￿ 
:
Next, it is not optimal for the monopolist to have p 2
￿
pd ￿ ￿;pd + ￿
￿
as p = pd + ￿







































[ cd + (  ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ c)](cd)
￿ :




= 1. The c2 bound is easy to ￿nd
because it is clear (as the pro￿t function is increasing for p < pint) that c2 must be such that




 ￿1 + ￿, so c2 = cd + ￿. The more involved case is the one
where c < cd as then there can be two local maxima (this is possible as the demand function







and c1 < cd. To obtain an approximate value of c1, note that R(c;c;0) = 1: when ￿ = 0,
the cuto⁄corresponds to c = cd. Also, calculations show R1 (c;c;0) = 0 and R11 (c;c;0) 6= 0.
Hence, a small ￿ implies a change ￿c1 such that, to the leading order, 1
2R11￿(￿c)
2+R3￿￿ = 0,
i.e., c1 = cd ￿
q
￿2R3￿
R11 + +O(￿). Calculations yield c1 = cd ￿ 2
p
cd￿=  + O(￿). ￿
Proof of Proposition 6 It is clear that the optimal solution a belongs to fE[Y ] ￿ m;E[Y ] + mg.
If the o⁄er is a = E[Y ] ￿ m, the o⁄er is accepted only if X = E[Y ] ￿ m (in the model-in-
model), so:
V
M2 (E[Y ] ￿ m) =
1
2
(￿(E[Y ] ￿ m) ￿ (E[Y ] ￿ m)) =
￿ ￿ 1
2
(E[Y ] ￿ m):
43If the o⁄er is a = E[Y ] + m, the buyer gets the ￿rm for sure, which has a value to him of
￿E[Y ] in expectation, so:
V
M2 (E[Y ] + m) = ￿E[Y ] ￿ (E[Y ] + m) = (￿ ￿ 1)E[Y ] ￿ m:
Note that V M2 (E[Y ] + m) > V M2 (E[Y ] ￿ m) if ￿ ￿ 3. Once we have ￿ < 3, the
two pro￿ts V M2 (E[Y ] ￿ m) and V M2 (E[Y ] + m) are the same if and only if m = ￿￿1
3￿￿E[Y ].
Thus, the optimal decision is as announced in the proposition. The maximum paid is E[Y ]+
￿￿1
3￿￿E[Y ] = 2
3￿￿E[Y ].
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This appendix presents additional derivations and some reasonable variants of the model.
9 Additional Derivations
9.1 Derivation of the Fixed Point pd in the Monopoly Pricing
Model of Section 4.3






The p(￿) function is given by Proposition 5. Call F and f = F 0 the CDF and PDF of c, and
c = E[c]. Also, de￿ne A = 2
p
cd= , so that c1 = cd ￿A
p
￿+O(￿). When ￿ = 0, cd = c, so
for small ￿ we look for a solution cd close to c. We have:






= E[ c] + ￿E[1c<c1] ￿ ￿E[1c>c2] + E
￿￿









=  c + ￿(F (c1) ￿ (1 ￿ F (c2))) + E
￿￿
 c





































































  ￿ 1
=
 
  ￿ 1
c +
1
  ￿ 1
(2cf (c) + 2F (c) ￿ 1)￿ + o(￿): (44)
50Monopoly pricing model of Section 4.3 with a ￿xed cost It may be interesting
to compare the paper￿ s model to a variant with a ￿xed cost of cognition. We will see that we
maintain the stickiness, but we lose the ￿sales￿e⁄ect: the pricing function stops exhibiting
the ￿cli⁄￿at c1. Instead, it exhibits two symmetrical jumps at c1 and c2.
The agent sees the price p. If he pays a ￿xed cost K, he uses the price p in his decision.





￿ ￿p ￿ pd￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
p if
￿ ￿p ￿ pd￿ ￿ > ￿





D(p) = p￿ . Its solution is as follows.




pd + ￿ if c1 ￿ c ￿ c2
 c
 ￿1 if c = 2 (c1;c2)
(45)
where c1 < c2 solve equation (46), and are equal to ci = cd ￿
q
2cd￿
  +O(￿) for small ￿. The
pricing function is discontinuous at c1 and c2, and continuous elsewhere.
Proof. (Sketch) The proof is as above. When the consumer is inattentive, p = pd + ￿,






pd + ￿ ￿ c
￿￿
pd￿￿ . When the consumer is attentive (and





as above. So, the ci￿ s solve:
f (ci;￿) = 0 (46)
f (c;￿) :=
(  ￿ 1)
 ￿1


















= 0. So a small ￿ implies a change ￿c1 such that, to the leading
order, 1
2f11 ￿(￿c)
2 +f3 ￿￿ = 0, i.e., ci = cd ￿￿c with ￿c =
q
￿2f3￿




  + O(￿).
23The derivation is: the DM picks minpBR (p
BR￿p)
2





d = . Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) have similar analytics for the DM￿ s decision, but do
derive the monopolist￿ s response.
519.2 Derivations of Additional Examples
This section presents the solutions to some of the early examples in the paper.
Example 2. Consider the case u(c) = ￿e￿￿c, r ￿ N (￿;￿2), " ￿ N (0;￿2
"), and r;"
jointly Gaussian with covariance ￿r". Then, we have:
V (a;m) = Eu(w + ae r + me ")
= u
￿







Va (a;m) = ￿￿u
￿







￿ ￿ ￿m￿r" ￿ ￿a￿
2￿
: (47)
The default model is md = 0 (the decision maker does not take into account the back-























































where ￿a is the normal variation in allocation, e.g., coming from an underlying dynamic
problem (for instance, it might depend on variations in the estimated equity premium ￿).















As expected, if background risk covaries positively with stocks (￿r" is higher), then the
allocation in stocks (a￿) weakly falls. However, this e⁄ect is truncated: if
￿ ￿￿r"
￿2






= 0, and there is no e⁄ect. Hence, the agent reacts only to large enough
background risk.
52Example 3. To reduce notational clutter, I solve this example with u(c) = v (c) =
c1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿), Rd = 1. The net interest rate is rt = Rt ￿ 1. We have:





1￿￿ (w ￿ a)
1￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
Va (a;Rt;m) = a
￿￿ ￿ R(m)
1￿￿ (w ￿ a)
￿￿ :
So at md = 0, Va
￿
ad;Rt;md￿




































































Hence, the interest rate perceived by the decision maker is R(m￿) = 1 + m￿rt, i.e.,
R(m









The agent￿ s attention to the interest rate is lower when the net interest rate rt is small
and when the agent￿ s intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1=￿, is close to 1. Indeed,
when




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ jrtj the decision maker does not pay attention to the interest rate at
all.













539.3 Change in Lagrange Multiplier after a Shift
Consider the problem:
max
a u(a;s) s.t. B (a;s) ￿ 0
where a is the action and s is a ￿shift￿parameter (which is general and could represent a
shift in income, price, taste, etc.), and the objection function u and the budget constraint
￿B are concave in a. We will derive the change in action ￿a when there is an in￿nitesimal
parameter shift ￿s. De￿ne the Lagrangian:
L(a;s;￿) = u(a;s) + ￿B (a;s): (52)
We suppose that the constraint binds, ￿ > 0.






















































With other notations, p = ￿Ba, ￿y = B0
s￿s (the notations are inspired by the example





where ￿￿ adjusts to satisfy the budget constraint:
￿p
0￿a + ￿y = 0: (56)
The interpretation is that b is the vector of the basis axis of adjustment when the dollar
budget changes. Call ￿c = ￿L￿1
aaLas￿s the ￿myopic￿change without thinking about the
budget constraint. Then,
￿a = ￿c ￿ b￿￿
54where ￿￿ solves (56):
￿y = p
0 (￿c ￿ b￿￿)















The interpretation of (54) is as follows. The ￿rst term, ￿L￿1
aaLas￿s, is the ￿myopic￿change
in action, using the same prices (Lagrange multiplier) as before the shift and forgetting about
the budget constraint. The term is the change in action to satisfy the budget constraint.
This interpretation motivates Step 3 in the Sparse BR algorithm with constraints (Algorithm
2).
In equation (55), the ￿rst term is a direct change of income, and the second is the change
in the price, La, that is orthogonal to the price vector Ba.
Proof of Lemma : Di⁄erentiating La (a;s;￿) = 0;
0 = Laa￿a + Las￿s + La￿￿￿;
so as La￿ = Ba,
￿a = ￿L
￿1
aa (Las￿s + Ba￿￿): (58)































Note that when there are K budget constraints, then B0
aL￿1


























































10 Some Enrichments of the Model
10.1 Enrichments of the Basic Sparse BR Model
Operator language To express variants of the model, it is useful to use the following












(￿￿mf)(a) = ￿m ￿ @mf (m); (￿￿af)(a) = ￿a ￿ @af (a):
(59)
The notation @af (a) is the di⁄erential of f at point a, and the dot ￿ is the vector product;




@ai (a). With that notation, in the Sparse BR model, the








However, the operator notation generalizes more easily.
Discrete sets, non-di⁄erential operators Sometimes (e.g., when the space under-
lying a is not continuous) it is useful to replace the di⁄erential operators used in Algorithm






























(a) = f (a + ￿a) ￿ f (a):
How to de￿ne ￿a + ￿a￿when the action space A is ￿nite? Assume that space A comes
equipped with a distance d(a;a0): for instance, if A = f1;:::;ng ordered in N, d(a;a0) =
ja ￿ a0j, and if A is just a set of options with no clear metric (e.g., 4 options with no particular
spatial ordering), we can have d(a;a0) = 1a6=a0. Then, ￿a+￿a￿stands for a random variable
variable e a with P(e a = a0) = Ke￿￿d(a;a0) for some ￿ > 0 and a constant K: it has a mode at
a, and decreases away from a.
56Likewise, sometimes (e.g., when dealing with functions with discrete support) it might
be useful to have a non-di⁄erential version of the ￿ matrix. A simple device is to consider





￿ (￿);￿) ￿ u(a
￿ (mi;￿￿i);￿)] (60)
where a￿ (m) is the optimum under the model parametrized by m.
Averaging In the baseline model, ￿ is evaluated at the default action and repre-
sentation. We could extend that by averaging around the baseline. For instance, de￿ne











where the expectation is over ￿a, ￿d, and x. So, we add noise around ad and md.
For instance, if we use the default action (no saving), there is no impact of the interest
rate, the simple ￿ is 0. But with averaging, the agent will see that for some other policies
(non-zero saving) the interest rate does matter.
Enrichment via loss aversion One interesting enrichment is to use a loss-aversion-
based penalty for negative outcomes but not positive ones. Denote x￿ = max(￿x;0), i.e.,
x￿ = ￿x for x < 0 and 0 for x ￿ 0. Call ￿￿ the ￿loss aversion￿operator, (￿￿f)(x) =
(f (x))
￿. Instead of the original formulation (11), ￿[a] = ￿a P
i k￿ai￿￿mV k, we could have





This operator ￿￿ may be useful, ￿rst, because loss aversion seems important in many
parts of economic psychology. Also, it is serviceable in the (relatively rare) cases where a
gamble is o⁄ered with no downside. To see this, take the problem where the agent can pick
a quantity a 2 [0;1] of a gamble g with non-negative support, i.e., the agent obtains utility
u(ag). It is clear that, whatever the complexity of g, by domination, picking a = 1 is the
right thing to do. This is missed by the basic algorithm, but is detected with the loss aversion
operator: normalizing u(0) = 0,
￿[a] = ￿






57because u(ag) ￿ u(0) ￿ 0 almost surely. Then, it is clear that there is no penalty for
complexity.








This is adding a ￿loss aversion￿operator to the previous operators. It seems that in
many situations it is not worth bothering about the loss aversion operator ￿￿ , which adds
some algebraic complexity, but it is good to have it available when ￿domination￿patterns
are important.
Finally, the decision maker might restrict himself to a parametrization of the actions. For
instance, if the underlying action is A = (A1;:::;AT) where At is the savings rate at time t,
we can have At (a) = a0 + a1t, a savings rate that depends in an a¢ ne way on age, where
(a0;a1) is a 2-dimensional parametrization of the agent￿ s savings rate.
Contingencies-matching Suppose there is a random variable " in the value function,
V (a;x;m;"). Then, the following variant of Step 2 of Algorithm 1 may be useful.
Step 2￿: For each realization of the noise ", pick the best action:
a(x;") 2 max
a V (a;x;m;") ￿ ￿[a] (62)
and then play a(") according to the probability of ".
This variant accounts for ￿probability matching.￿In the paradigmatic game, a biased coin
will be tossed and come out as heads with probability 0:7, say, and heads with probability
0:3. Subjects have to predict which side will be drawn. They tend to predict heads with
probability 0:7. This is a deviation from rationality which implies betting on heads at all
times. Step 2￿above generates that behavior even when ￿a is set to 0: with probability 0:7
(resp. 0:3), the agent draws heads (resp. tails), and best-responds to it.
A Sparse BR model with ￿xed cost For some purposes, it may be useful to have a
model with a ￿xed cost of thinking, rather than the ‘1 cost of thinking worked out in the
paper. To this end, I propose the following model. It pays keen attention to the scaling of
the various costs and bene￿ts.
Algorithm 3 (Sparse BR Algorithm with Fixed Costs) To solve the problem maxa V (a;x;￿),
the agent uses the following two steps:
581. Optimize on the representation of the world. Using the realism loss matrix ￿






0 ￿(m ￿ ￿) + ￿[m]: (63)
The ￿rst part is a measure of expected loss from a poor simulation while the second






2. Optimize on the action. Maximize over the action a:
max
a V (a;x;m) ￿ ￿[a]







In the formulation of Algorithm 3, the costs ￿[m] and ￿[a] are ￿xed costs. The agent
pays the cost only if mi 6= md
i. The model includes some scaling of the ￿xed cost: that is to
satisfy the invariance properties listed in Proposition 1. Here, ￿m represents some variability
of m.
Problem (63)-(64) is non-convex, so in general it is very di¢ cult to solve. However, when


























when a is one-dimensional.
The idea is that agents pay the ￿xed cost only if the di⁄erence between the default and
the optimal representation is large enough (
￿ ￿md
i ￿ ￿i
￿ ￿ > ￿i), and if the action is important
enough (high ￿ii).
59